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Nous passons en revue dans cette étude les principales questions
touchant la transférabilité des pertes fiscales en cas de changement de contrôle
d'une entreprise. L'opportunité d'autoriser ou non le transfert des pertes fiscales
dépend de l'efficacité du marché des prises de contrôle. Si les prises de contrôle
accroissant l'efficacité sont trop peu nombreuses, il convient de les
« subventionner ». Si, au contraire, les prises de contrôles sont trop nombreuses
(sous l'angle de l'efficacité), il convient de les taxer sous une forme quelconque.
Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, le régime de transférabilité des pertes fiscales peut
servir à atteindre l'objectif visé. Trois aspects sont abordés ici : (1) l'opportunité
d'autoriser le transfert des pertes fiscales en cas de changement de contrôle d'une
entreprise; (2) l'opportunité d'autoriser ce transfert uniquement lorsque le type
d'activité reste le même; (3) l'opportunité d'autoriser l'utilisation des pertes au même
rythme qu'avant la fusion. Ces questions seront analysées dans le contexte du
contrôle exercé par les directions d'entreprise, de la concurrence sur le marché des
produits, des décisions de financement, ainsi que des décisions d'investissement et
de la prise de risque.
This paper surveys the major issues regarding the transferability of tax
losses upon a change of control. Whether tax losses should be transferable or not
depends on whether the market for corporate control is efficient or not. If there are
too few efficiency-enhancing takeovers, then takeovers should be "subsidized". If,
on the contrary, there are too many takeovers (from an efficiency point of view),
then takeovers should somehow be taxed. In either case, the transferability of tax
losses may be an instrument for doing so. Three aspects are considered: (1)
whether tax losses should be transferred upon a change of control or not, (2)
whether the transfer should be restricted to the same line of business or not, and
(3) whether losses should be used at the same speed at which they were (to be)
used pre-merger or not. These issues are then discussed in the context of
managerial control, product market competition, financing decisions, and
investment decisions and risk-taking.
Mots Clés : Pertes fiscales, fusions
Keywords : Tax losses, mergers
1 Introduction
It is a well established fact that the asymmetric scal treatment of rms'
losses and prots introduces distortions in economic decisions. An im-
portant question is whether rms can arbitrage away these distortions
by any means. Mergers or takeovers may provide one way of eliminating,
or at least reducing, distortions due to the tax asymmetry. A rm with
accumulated losses can merge with a protable rm. If this latter rm
can use the former's losses against its taxable income, it can reduce its
tax bill, and by the same token reduce the distortions induced by the
accumulated losses.
This paper surveys the major issues regarding the transferability of
tax losses upon a change of control. Four basic areas where distortions
could potentially arise are studied: corporate governance and managerial
control, competition in product markets, nancial decisions, and invest-
ment and risk-taking. For each area, the general approach is (1) to detail
the economic distortions and ineciencies and their sources, (2) to study
the eciency with which the market for corporate control acts to reduce
these distortions, and nally (3) to ask whether more takeover activity
should be encouraged via allowing the transfer of tax losses.
Specically, three aspects of this issue are studied: 1) whether tax
losses should be transferred upon a change of control or not, (2) whether
the transfer should be restricted to the same line of business or not, and
(3) whether losses should be used at the same speed at which they were
(to be) used pre-merger or not.
To answer these questions, it is rst necessary to dene what tax
neutrality is in this context. A global approach would be to dene neu-
trality as the situation where tax losses would be fully refundable, so
that all distortions due to tax losses asymmetries would be eliminated.
I believe, however, that to address the specic issues set out in this pa-
per with this notion of neutrality would be inappropriate since other
aspects of the question of refundability are clearly outside the scope of
this paper. For example, even without mergers of rms, tax losses are
not fully refundable. I therefore adopt the following narrower denition
of neutrality. Neutrality is dened as tax losses being available on the
same basis regardless of any takeover activity. As will become clear later,
we may want to move away from neutrality for eciency reasons if the
\neutral" situation is inecient.
Second, the notion of eciency should also be dened. In this paper,
we adopt a notion of eciency which relates only to the partial envi-
ronment under study. For example, it may be the case that allowing
the transfer of tax losses would improve eciency in the market for cor-
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porate control, but would reduce it globally when taking into account
the fact that government revenues would go down and that, probably,
distortionary taxes would be needed to make up for the lost revenues.
Analyzing such eects is clearly important but beyond the scope of this
article.
The next section studies the case of corporate governance and man-
agerial control. Section 3 analyses distortions in product market compe-
tition. Section 4 focuses on nancial decisions, while Section 5 studies
investment decisions and risk-taking. The conclusion follows.
2 Corporate governance and managerial con-
trol
It has been known for a long time that the separation of ownership and
control in large public companies creates opportunities for managers to
divert resources from shareholders and bondholders to themselves (see
Berle and Means, 1933). If managers do not own the resources and assets
they control, why should they maximize their value? The reply to this
question was given by Manne (1965). The threat of takeover or the actual
takeover would serve as a disciplinary device to ensure that ecient
decision making prevails within the rm. Thus, the market for corporate
control would restore economic eciency. If a manager is misbehaving, a
potential raider would immediately spot this ineciency. He would then
buy the rm's stock at a below-value price, restore ecient decision-
making, and thus obtain a capital gain on his shares in this rm. The
presence of these capital gains would be sucient to give incentives to
raiders to seek economic eciency.
This argument held for a long time. It was not, however, completely
convincing since it implicitly assumed that raiders could better correct
ineciencies than could stakeholders (shareholders and/or bondholders).
To understand whether this is an appropriate assumption or not, it is
necessary to formally detail what are the sources of the managerial inef-
ciencies and see how the market for corporate control can correct them.
Therefore, more recently, economists have returned to the study of the
market for corporate control and made precise what were the inecien-
cies induced by the separation of ownership and control. These new
studies have shed a new light on our understanding of the market for
corporate control.
In this section, I explain how takeovers may or may not improve
economic eciency, and show how the treatment of tax losses can be
incorporated in the argument. There are two instances where tax losses
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may play a role. First, the asymmetric treatment of tax losses may aect
the extent of managerial ineciencies, which would then feed back on
the market for corporate control. Second, the transferability of tax losses
aects the market for corporate control per se. These two eects are
assessed in the light of modern theories of managerial ineciencies and
the market for corporate control.
There are basically two dierent theories of the market for corporate
control as it relates to managerial ineciencies. The rst theory is the
standard one that the separation of ownership and control creates ine-
ciencies that may be corrected via the market for corporate control which
acts as a watch dog, contributing to the improvement of the eciency of
the economy. The second theory argues that the market for corporate
control creates a short-term bias in managerial decision-making, thus
exacerbating managerial ineciencies. These two theories produce dif-
ferent conclusions as to whether an active market for corporate control
is a good thing or not. I now explain in turn these two theories and
relate them to the issue of the treatment of tax losses.
2.1 Managerial ineciencies and the market for cor-
porate control
The following arguments are mostly due to Grossman and Hart (1980)
and Scharfstein (1988). A manager controls a rm's assets which gener-
ate a random cash ow. The manager can inuence the distribution of
this cash ow through his eort and/or ecient decision making. For ex-
ample, the manager may put more eort into the evaluation of projects
to ensure that his decisions are the right ones. Alternatively, the man-
ager may be tempted to invest in projects that are personally important,
such as \empire-building" investments, but that are not protable to the
rm. Furthermore, the assets under the manager's control may be worth
more to a third party, that is, there may be synergy gains emerging from
a takeover by this third party. The value of the assets is thus determined
by managerial discretion and potential synergy gains.
A raider who may bring about these synergy gains has gathered a
lot of information about the manager's behavior, and he therefore knows
whether a takeover is protable or not. He would like to take the rm
over when these synergy gains are positive, that is, when the assets are
worth more under his control than under the manager's control. Whether
such eciency is attained depends on informational assumptions about
the manager's actions. Before considering dierent assumptions, it is
important to explain how a takeover can take place.
Suppose rst that the takeover price is determined through bargain-
3
ing with the existing shareholders. The price oered by the raider must
be such that he expects a capital gain from the transaction. The share-
holders know, however, that if a raider has come along, there must be
synergy gains to be realized. Given this, why should anyone sell at the
oered price if they can appropriate the capital gain by waiting for the
raider to take control and implement changes that should increase the
rm's value. Grossman and Hart (1980) have argued that a takeover is
like a public good that produces value for all shareholders, and that, in-
dividually, they all have incentives not to sell, or, in other words, to hold
out. Given that they all hold out, no takeover can ever take place with
the result that potential synergy gains are not achieved. Grossman and
Hart (1980) have argued that corporate charters can be used to dilute
the value of a minority share, thus providing incentive for shareholders
to tender their shares. The optimal degree of dilution trades o the
probability of being taken over with the expected price that such dilu-
tion entails. Using the corporate charter, shareholders play the role of a
price-setting monopolist that must trade-o a higher price with the prob-
ability of selling. We now explain how the market for corporate control
works under dierent assumptions about the information shareholders
have about the manager's actions.
Suppose rst that shareholders can monitor perfectly the manager's
actions. In this case, all managerial ineciencies are eliminated by share-
holders' monitoring and activism. Takeovers can only occur for the re-
alization of synergy gains. For a given degree of dilution chosen in the
charter, takeovers will occur for suciently large synergy gains that o-
set the opportunistic behavior of shareholders. In general, there are too
few takeovers as the market for corporate control cannot generate all
socially optimal takeovers.
Can the scal treatment of tax losses improve economic eciency?
First, the asymmetric treatment of tax losses per se is not likely to
alter signicantly the degree of discretion the manager exerts on the
assets under his control. Second, the transferability of tax losses may,
however, aect the incidence of takeovers. In this simple example, there
is under supply of takeovers. There is, therefore, a case to be made for
\subsidizing" takeovers compared to a neutral policy. A neutral policy
would restrict the speed of use of tax losses to that prior to the takeover.
It may also restrict the line of business in which losses could be used
following a takeover. In the present case, an optimal policy should move
away from neutrality to encourage more takeovers. Moving towards full
transferability of tax losses would be one instrument to increase the
nancial gains and hence, produce more takeovers. Relaxing restrictions
on the speed of use of tax losses should also help. Having a non-neutral
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policy is socially desirable. Of course, whether one wants to allow full
transferability, or put no restrictions at all on the speed of use, depends
on empirical issues that go beyond the scope of this research.
I now turn to the more interesting case where the shareholders can-
not or do not monitor the manager's actions, and the raider has the
information about the manager's actions. Suppose that the manager
has shirked. The price of the rm's share is accordingly low. Sharehold-
ers, however, cannot distinguish between the case where the manager
has shirked and the case where demand is low. The raider can, how-
ever, distinguish between these two cases. The probability of takeover
is therefore higher when the manager has shirked. The manager antic-
ipates this outcome on the market for corporate control. Since he gets
nothing in the advent of a takeover, he is reluctant to shirk. The threat
of takeover therefore disciplines the manager in limiting his discretion
over the rm's assets. The key assumption that ensures that takeovers
have a disciplinary role is that the raider can monitor the manager's
actions, which then makes the occurrence of takeovers correlated with
the manager's behavior. This is not an unrealistic assumption as many
raiders usually gather rm-specic information about their potential tar-
gets before bidding for them.
Is there a policy role for the treatment of tax losses? Again, asym-
metric taxation is not likely to play a major role here. Transferable tax
losses should aect the probability of a takeover by increasing poten-
tial nancial gains. Consequently, as in the previous case, subsidizing
takeovers by moving away from a neutral policy may enhance economic
eciency since there are too few takeovers in equilibrium. Whether this
inuences the incentives of the manager to maximize rm's value or not
is hard to evaluate. It depends on the distribution of synergy gains, an
issue on which it is hard to obtain specic conclusions.
To summarize, the asymmetric treatment of tax losses cannot play a
major role in restoring managerial incentives under the threat of takeovers.
A non-neutral policy with regards to the transferability of tax losses
would increase the number of actual takeovers for synergy reasons, which
would be socially desirable. Any judgment along these lines should, how-
ever, be deferred until takeovers in the context of product market compe-
tition are analyzed. Before doing so, however, I present the other theory
of the market for corporate control that emphasizes the short-term bias
of nancial markets.
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2.2 Managerial myopia and the market for corporate
control
The informal business press often stresses that pressure from nancial
markets forces managers into maximizing current earnings to the ex-
pense of longer term objectives. This reduces rm value. The argument
is even pushed to suggest that this short-term bias puts North Ameri-
can economies at a disadvantage compared with European or Japanese
economies where nancial pressure is much less, and therefore, where
rms maximize long-term value. Even though these arguments were
more popular when North American economies were not performing as
well as now compared to their foreign rivals, I think they still deserve
some attention.
The folk response to the short-term argument was that if a rm was
indeed sacricing long-term gains for short-run prots, it would be taken
over by a raider who would restore economic eciency. Consequently,
managerial short-term bias cannot exist when the market itself has no
short-run bias. Furthermore, ample evidence of rational nancial mar-
kets is found in the literature (for a survey of this evidence, see Jensen,
1988).
One potential example of this argument is that nancial markets
react positively to the announcement that a rm increases its R&D ex-
penditures (its share price increases following the announcement). This
is taken as evidence that nancial markets correctly value the longer
term. Recently, however, Stein (1988, 1989) has convincingly argued
that this evidence is not inconsistent with the presence of a short-run
bias in managerial decision making. He argues that, if managers focus
too much on the short term, more R&D becomes a good signal that
the rm is undertaking a long-term investment, and therefore, the stock
price should react positively.
1
Stein's theory is now explained. Two assumptions are essential for
this result to hold. First, managers must care about the rm's current
share price. This assumption is easy to justify. It may be that the
manager is partly compensated by shares of the rm. Or, it may be
that the manager needs to nance new investments with equity issues,
so that he prefers a higher price to a lower price in order not to dilute
too much existing shareholders' ownership. It may also be that the
manager is averse to the rm being taken over, and a higher share price
minimizes the likelihood of a takeover. The second necessary assumption
1
I should also point out that I am aware of no empirical study that has tried to
test these two competing arguments, which makes the eciency analysis of takeovers
problematic.
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is that nancial investors do not know the rm's precise value or growth
potential. They infer this information from the rm's current earnings.
Under these assumptions, the challenge facing managers is to maxi-
mize a weighted sum of today's and tomorrow's share price. To do so,
managers can choose projects that have high current earnings but low
future prospects, or projects costly in the short run but more protable
in the long run. Stein (1989) shows that the more the manager cares
about today's share price, the more he distorts investments in favor of
the short run. The manager has a short-run bias which adversely af-
fects the rm's value. In equilibrium, rational nancial investors are not
fooled and the rm's value is correctly assessed taking into account that
the manager has distorted investment. The manager, however, is caught
in a kind of prisoner's dilemma. Given the nancial investors' expecta-
tions that he will boost current earnings, failure to do so will result in
investors thinking that the rm has lower value than it really has, thus
exacerbating the problem. In equilibrium, it is as if the manager was
behaving myopically favoring current earnings rather than maximizing
rm's value.
This theory can be related to managerial eciency and takeovers.
The higher the probability of takeovers, the more myopically does the
manager behave. Hence, in this theory, takeovers are more detrimental
than benecial to the rm's long-term value.
2
Stein (1988) considers the trade-o between the synergistic value of
takeovers with their cost in terms of managerial short-run bias and asks
whether takeovers should be favored or not. He shows that if raiders are
informed about the long-term prospects of the rm, takeovers always lead
to an improvement in economic eciency when managers care about the
long-term value of the rm.
3
When raiders are uninformed, managers
may be tempted to boost current earnings if they expect shareholders
to be pessimistic when confronted with a low current share price. In
that case, synergy gains are eliminated by the myopic behavior of the
manager, and takeovers are detrimental to economic eciency.
To summarize, \rational" managerial myopia can be motivated by
the fact that managers care about a rm's share price and that they
are better informed about the rm's long-term value. In such environ-
ment, takeovers are generally detrimental to economic eciency. This
conclusion must, however, be qualied once synergy gains are taken into
account. Whether takeovers are benecial or not depends on whether
2
It should be noted that no synergy gains have been incorporated in the analysis
so far.
3
If they also care about being in control, they may be tempted to boost current
earnings (and the current share price) to discourage any raider.
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one believes that raiders are usually better informed than other nancial
investors about the long-term value of the rm. This is surely not an
unrealistic assumption.
Is there a role for the treatment of tax losses in this environment?
First, it should be noted that given that managers signal their rm's
value by boosting current earnings, losses become less likely in equilib-
rium than if managers were undertaking long-term investments. Sec-
ond, a non-neutral policy with respect to the transferability of tax losses
again can become an instrument for restoring the socially optimal sup-
ply of takeovers. Dierent cases are considered. Without synergy gains,
takeovers reduce economic eciency, which implies that takeovers should
be discouraged to reduce managerial myopia. This could partly be
achieved by moving away from a neutral policy and restricting the trans-
ferability of tax losses upon change of control. Restrictions could then be
placed on the line of business and the speed of use of tax losses following
the takeover.
When signicant synergy gains are present, however, takeovers play
an important role in placing assets in the hands of the agents that value
them most. As Stein (1988) shows, takeovers play that role optimally
as long as raiders are informed of the rm's long-term prospects. If
managers value the long run, takeovers are optimal and a neutral policy
for the transferability of tax losses is desirable. Losses should be allowed
to be transferred to raiders that are likely to have synergy gains with
the rm in question. And, tax losses should also be used at the same
speed as prior to the takeover. This can be achieved by putting in place
a policy similar to that of the U.S. (see Section A.2 in the Appendix for
details). The American policy restricts the speed of use of tax losses to
that which would have occurred had no takeover taken place. In any
given year, losses can only be used up to the acquired rm's fair market
value of equity times the long-term return on federal bonds. This implies
that losses used cannot exceed the acquired rm's equity value over time.
This policy is therefore successful in restricting the speed of use of losses
following a takeover.
If, however, managers value control or give value to current share
price, then takeovers fail to achieve full eciency. In that case, a non-
neutral policy that moves toward full transferability of losses and relaxes
speed of use restrictions may improve economic eciency by reducing the
cost to the raider of taking over the rm.
2.3 Other considerations
In this section, I survey other considerations that are relevant for takeovers.
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Shleifer and Summers (1988) have argued that an undesirable con-
sequence of takeovers is that they breach implicit contracts among the
rm's stakeholders. Raiders would benet from the takeovers by \steal-
ing" rents from workers, shareholders or bondholders. If the threat of
takeovers is suciently high, agents may underinvest in rm-specic hu-
man capital for fear of being held up by a raider. In that case, takeovers
would generally cause ineciencies. I do not think this argument should
inuence public policy regarding takeovers for the following reasons.
First, there are many means for breaking implicit contracts, a takeover
being but one of them. For example, it has been argued that rms
have used outsourcing of formerly vertically integrated activities to steal
workers' rents and lower the wage bill. Secondly, golden parachutes have
been designed to protect managerial rents in case of a takeover. Conse-
quently, breach-of-trust arguments as put forth by Shleifer and Summers
(1988) should not inuence tax policy regarding takeovers.
(1986) has argued that an important conict between managers and
shareholders concerns the disposition of the rm's free cash ow. Man-
agers have a tendency to keep resources within the rm by investing in
low (or negative) NPV projects rather than pay dividends. Leveraged
takeovers can then restore eciency as debt becomes a commitment to
pay out free cash ow to bondholders in the form of interest payments.
A rm with free cash ow is likely to have been protable in the past.
Given asymmetric tax treatment of losses, its losses then produce tax
refunds. Such tax tratment may then exacerbate the free cash ow prob-
lem, and require more drastic solutions.
2.4 Conclusion
What does the eciency of the market for corporate control teaches
us about the optimal policy for transferability of tax losses? The only
instances where a non-neutral policy could potentially play a role are
the following.
1. If corporate charters set dilution parameters to encourage takeovers
and maximize shareholders' gains from doing so, then there are
too few takeovers, and they could be encouraged via a non-neutral
policy that removes restrictions on line of business and speed of
use of losses.
2. If synergy gains are small, takeovers induce myopic behavior and
should therefore be discouraged (or not encouraged). Hence, tax
losses should not be transferable.
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3. If synergy gains are large and raiders are well informed, the occur-
rence of takeovers is optimal, and the transferability of tax losses is
not an issue. A neutral policy is then optimal with line of business
restrictions and limited speed of use.
This analysis seems to be in accordance with empirical investigations
that show that tax losses do not have a signicant impact on the in-
cidence of takeovers (see Auerbach and Reihus, 1988). According to
theory, tax losses can only play at the margin. Given that takeovers are
costly and that tax losses are usually small compared with these costs
and synergy gains, they cannot play a signicant role in most cases.
3 Competition in product markets
The analysis of the eects of tax losses on product market competition
is split between competitive and imperfectly competitive markets.
3.1 Competitive markets
In competitive markets, Appelbaum and Katz (1987) study the eect of
the asymmetric treatment of tax losses on the structure and eciency
of a competitive economy. By assumption, all rms are price takers.
The authors show that the asymmetric treatment of losses increases the
eective marginal cost the rm is facing. The intuition for this result
is the following. When losses are treated symmetrically, rms choose
output by equating expected price with their marginal cost of produc-
tion. When losses are treated asymmetrically (and they can occur with
positive probability), rms take into account the fact that losses do not
generate a tax refund. They then reduce output to reduce the proba-
bility of being in a loss state. Consequently, in the market equilibrium,
price is higher than marginal cost even though each rm produces at the
minimum of their average-cost curve.
4
Given that the industry equilibrium is inecient, is there a role for
takeovers to restore eciency? The answer to this question depends
on the denition of neutrality that one adopts. If we use the narrow
denition of neutrality, then tax losses should not be transferable upon
a takeover since the only ineciency arises from the economy-wide non-
transferability of tax losses.
4
The equilibrium conguration is similar to one where the product would be taxed.
Firms face a higher marginal cost due to the tax and there is an eciency loss due
to the reduction in output.
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If, however, one adopts a broader denition of neutrality (that would
imply no distortions due to the asymmetric treatment of tax losses),
then tax losses transferability upon takeovers may undo (or partially
oset) the ineciency due to the asymmetric treatment of tax losses.
This ineciency implies that industry-wide costs are not minimized at
the competitive equilibrium. A restructuring of assets within the in-
dustry reduces total costs if tax losses are transferable. Furthermore,
removing restrictions regarding the line of business in which they can be
used would most likely be ecient. The reason is the following. In com-
petitive industries, losses are more likely to emerge from industry-wide
shocks, meaning that the occurrence of losses is correlated across rms.
If tax losses are transferable only to rms in the same line of business,
takeovers have little eect on eciency since the losses are not likely to
be used by any other rm. There would therefore be too few takeovers.
On the contrary, if tax losses are transferable without restrictions, a rm
in another industry could take over a rm and use the losses against its
prots in unrelated business. Such takeovers would be more likely to
occur with a raider and a target for which prots are negatively corre-
lated to maximize the probability of using the tax losses. Finally, the
speed of use for losses following the takeover should not be signicantly
increased in order not to encourage too many takeovers. Since takeovers
are costly, however, it may be desirable to increase it slightly to make
sure takeover costs do not excessively discourage takeover activity.
As the experience of the 1980's suggests, however, takeovers for the
purpose of diversication are not well perceived by nancial markets.
The general belief seems to be that diversication can be made at the
shareholders' level rather than at the corporate level. Can diversica-
tion for tax purposes follow the same logic? Not precisely. Sharehold-
ers cannot use a rm's tax losses. There are, however, other means of
transferring losses such as leasing and preferred share nancing (see Jog,
1991, for a recent survey).
5
Whether these means are preferred or not
to takeovers is an empirical question. Finally, takeovers in competitive
industries should always be closely monitored to ensure that they do not
confer market power to any new rm. If one rm gained some market
power, the ineciency that would arise from the exercise of that power
would have to be weighed against the eciency gain arising from the
elimination of the asymmetric tax treatment.
To summarize, in competitive industries, to maintain tax neutrality
(in a narrow sense), tax losses transferability should not be allowed. A
5
Jog notes that the use of preferred share nancing to transfer tax losses is now
subject to more restriction.
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broader denition of neutrality may yield a dierent result, but then it is
relevant to ask why not remove the asymmetric treatment of tax losses
instead of allowing full transferability upon a takeover if the purpose is
to remove tax distortions.
3.2 Imperfectly competitive markets
Two issues are worth discussing in imperfectly competitive markets.
First, what is the role of tax asymmetries on the degree of competition
and entry in imperfect product markets, and what role can a takeover
play in such environment. Second, takeovers can help restructure an
oligopolistic industry. Should such restructuring be encouraged or dis-
couraged via tax losses transferability?
Appelbaum and Katz (1996) study the eects of tax asymmetries
on behavior and entry in oligopolistic industries. The starting point
of their analysis is the fact that tax asymmetries may aect dierent
rms dierently (see Jog and Mintz, 1989). The dierence comes from
the fact that dierent rms have dierent prot and loss history which
conditions their current tax bill. As is the case with rms in competitive
environments, tax asymmetries aect a rm's post-tax marginal cost.
If a rm's past protability aects its marginal cost, it also aects the
nature of competition in an oligopolistic industry.
Past prots or losses increase a rm's expected value by reducing
current expected tax liabilities. If a rm with past prots incurs losses,
it can get a refund on tax paid on past prots, and if a rm with past
losses makes prots, it can reduce its tax bill by deducting past losses
from its current prots. This means that new rms in an industry are at
a disadvantage compared with established rms that are likely to have
past prots or losses that may be used against current losses or prots.
One may think that tax asymmetries act as a barrier to entry for new
rms in an industry. As we will see, this conclusion may be wrong.
In some cases, tax asymmetries may put incumbents at a disadvantage
compared to an entrant.
I rst consider the case where rms x their prices for long periods
of time and thus compete in quantities (Cournot competition). Under
Cournot competition, a rm gains from acting aggressively as it forces
its rivals to assume a less dominant or aggressive stance. An aggressive
rm can then increase its market share to the detriment of its rivals. I
then contrast the results with those in an industry where rms compete
in prices (Bertrand competition). Under Bertrand competition, a rm
does not gain from acting aggressively as it would also induce its rivals
to behave aggressively. A rm then has the incentive to increase its price
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as it expects its rivals to follow and increase their price also. As we will
see, results are sensitive to the nature of competition.
Suppose rst that rms compete in quantities. Assume that the
incumbent has accumulated past prots. These past prots reduce the
burden of the scal asymmetry as the incumbent can now get a tax
refund if he has current losses. This biases the incumbent's behavior
towards favoring the loss region. Consequently, the incumbent can aord
to be more aggressive and it produces more. The entrant expecting this
aggressivity responds by lowering its own output. Accumulated past
prots act as barrier to entry in that they induce the incumbent to be
aggressive if the entrant enters the industry. Suppose that accumulated
prots are a sign of protability for an industry. The tax asymmetry
is then likely to heighten the level of barriers to entry that make this
industry highly protable.
Suppose now that the incumbent has accumulated losses. As above,
these past losses reduce the burden of the asymmetry as the incumbent
can now escape taxation if it has current prots. This biases the in-
cumbent's behavior towards favoring the prot region. There are two
competing eects. First, the incumbent is less taxed, and it therefore
wants to produce more. Second, it favors the prot region, so it wants to
reduce the variance of prots by producing less. In general, the overall
eect cannot be signed. For a small accumulated loss, the variance-
reduction eect dominates and the incumbent reduces output. Losses
then have a collusive aspect. The incumbent is then at a competitive
disadvantage compared with the entrant. In that case, a small loss acts
as an enhancement to entry rather than a barrier to entry. If past losses
are an indication of the protability of an industry, then entry is not as
likely in an industry where rms would have accumulated past losses.
This case may not be as empirically relevant. If, however, past losses are
an indication of tax incentives available in the industry, entry may be
likely. In that case, the tax asymmetry would encourage entry beyond
tax incentives.
Now suppose that rms compete in prices. When the incumbent has
accumulated past prots, the burden of the scal asymmetry is reduced
as the incumbent can now get a tax refund if he has current losses. This
biases the incumbent's behavior towards favoring the loss region. Con-
sequently, the incumbent can aord to be more aggressive: it therefore
charges a lower price. The entrant expecting this aggressivity responds
by lowering its own price. Again, accumulated past prots act as barrier
to entry in that they induce the incumbent to be aggressive in the case of
entry. Since entry is more likely in protable industries (i.e., industries
where incumbents have accumulated past prots), the tax asymmetry is
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likely to have important eects on entry in this case.
When the incumbent has accumulated losses, the burden of the scal
asymmetry is lowered as the incumbent can now escape taxation if he
realizes current prots. This biases the incumbent's behavior towards
favoring the prot region. There are two competing eects. First, the
incumbent is less taxed, and it therefore wants to charge a lower price
to increase its prots. Second, it favors the prot region, so it wants
to reduce the variance of prots by charging a higher price. In general,
the overall eect cannot be signed. For a small accumulated loss, the
variance-reduction eect dominates and the incumbent charges a higher
price. The incumbent is then strategically disadvantaged compared with
the entrant. In that case, a small loss acts as an enhancement to entry
rather than a barrier to entry. If, however, past losses are an indication of
the protability of an industry, then entry is not as likely in an industry
where rms would have accumulated past losses. This case may not be
as empirically relevant.
Before discussing tax loss transferability, it should be noted that the
above results were derived in a static model of the world. In a dynamic
model, the eects of initial conditions often vanish rapidly. Whether
they would aect the nature of competition and entry signicantly would
depend on time preferences and the availability of external nancing to
smooth out early losses.
6
Past prots create distortions in oligopolistic industries by articially
aecting the nature of competition.
7
Past prots are likely to favor the
incumbent. For example, an entrant with lower costs than an incum-
bent could still be at a competitive disadvantage if the incumbent has
accumulated past prots and the entrant has no prot history. As we
saw above, the entrant's eective marginal cost would be higher than
the incumbent's, therefore placing the entrant in an adverse strategic
position. Small entrants are then strategically disadvantaged not only
because their eective after-tax marginal cost is high, but also because
the incumbent's is low. In an oligopoly, these two factors make the
incumbent strategically aggressive.
Under Cournot competition, entry is then more likely to be successful
if the entrant has prots from other lines of business since the existence
of past prots makes the entrant more aggressive. The tax asymmetry
6
I discuss in the next section the interaction between nancing decisions and the
treatment of tax losses.
7
Past losses may have opposite eects. I focus on past prots as they probably
are the most relevant case to treat when entry is analyzed. Past losses may actually
be a signal not to enter an industry, unless they indicate tax incentives available in
the industry.
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then favors entry by mature rms in unrelated industries. If tax losses
are transferable without restrictions, there are also incentives for a prof-
itable rm in an unrelated line of business to take over an entrant. The
takeover not only generates tax savings gains, but also gains in terms of
market share as the entrant now becomes more aggressive. A potential
downside to such takeover, from the point of view of the raider's other
businesses, is that the raider sees its accumulated prots for tax pur-
poses be lowered. Depending on the degree and nature of competition
in these other industries, this may have adverse strategic consequences
which would then have to weighted against the gains. Below, I discuss
more specically these eects.
Under Bertrand competition, an entrant would like to enter without
past prots for tax purposes. Past prots would make this entrant more
aggressive, which would then force the incumbent to also be more aggres-
sive. In that case, an entrant with past prots would have no strategic
advantage over a new rm.
8
Takeovers between a new entrant and a
protable rm in an unrelated line of business are not as likely as under
Cournot competition as the tax savings have to be weighed against the
lost protability of the new venture. The potential eects on the raider's
other line of business would also have to be taken into account.
Before discussing the optimal policy regarding tax losses transferabil-
ity (in the next section), I assess whether the presence of transferable
tax losses create incentives for mergers between rms with losses and
rms with prots or not. The occurrence of mergers is not trivial to
analyze in imperfectly competitive markets. If, in competitive markets,
a takeover can be evaluated solely on the basis of the tax savings that
would accrue to the merging parties, in oligopolistic markets, such anal-
ysis is complicated by the fact that the tax status of a rm alters its own
behavior and that of its rivals. For example, suppose that an incumbent
with past prots takes over another rm with past losses. Suppose that
these losses were slightly larger than the rst rm's past prots. The
aggregate tax status (small losses) of the new entity makes it compete
less aggressively than the rst rm was competing before. There are two
basic cases to consider.
In an industry where rms x prices for long periods (Cournot com-
petition), rivals compete more aggressively, which is detrimental to the
merging rms. Such takeover then has to be evaluated weighing the tax
savings against the loss of market power (and possibly market share).
9
8
It may nonetheless have cost or nancing advantages which are abstracted from
for the sake of the argument. See, for example, Poitevin (1989).
9
The discussion as to whether such takeover is socially benecial or not is delayed
to the end of this section.
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The nature of competition in a Cournot industry is likely to reduce the
number of mergers for tax purposes.
In an industry where rms adjust prices in the short run (Bertrand
competition), such takeovers are more likely to occur. When rms com-
pete in prices, a reduction in a rm's price induces its rivals to also reduce
their price. The takeover makes the new entity less aggressive in price
competition, thus charging a higher price. Its rivals then respond by
also increasing their prices. The resulting equilibrium has rms charg-
ing higher prices and earning higher prots. The takeover of the two
rms results in a more collusive industry. In that case, the tax savings
motive for takeover is reinforced by the increased collusion in the indus-
try. In industries where rms compete in prices, there is an increased
motive for merger due to the asymmetric scal treatment of losses.
3.3 Eects of mergers in imperfectly competitive in-
dustries
As we saw above, mergers in imperfectly competitive industries are likely
to have signicant impact on the extent of competition. I now step back
for a moment and put aside taxation issues to explain the welfare eects
of mergers in oligopolies. This is necessary to assess whether merger
activity should be taxed or subsidized, possibly through the regulation
of the transferability of tax losses.
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have studied extensively the eect of merg-
ers on welfare in a Cournot industry.
10
At rst, a merger may appear to
lower welfare in an imperfectly competitive industry as it increases con-
centration, hence market power. This may be an erroneous conclusion
as a merger may help rationalize production in an industry. If all rms
have the same constant marginal cost of production, a merger always
increases market price and lowers social welfare. If, however, rms dier
in their cost of production (a likely outcome in imperfectly competitive
industries), a merger may help rationalize production. Keeping aggre-
gate output xed, a merger may reduce the total costs of production
in the industry by shifting some production from a high-cost rm to a
low-cost rm. This is not the end of the story, however. Following the
merger, rms adjust their behavior to the new industry structure. The
contribution of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) is to determine the conditions
under which the rationalization eect dominates any market power ef-
fect. I now summarize their results and then apply them to our taxation
issues.
10
Social welfare is dened as the sum of consumer surpluses and rm prots.
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If a merger generates no cost synergy, then market price increases.
In that case, reducing the number of rms only serves to increase market
concentration, which results in a higher price. This implies that synergies
are necessary for a merger to result in a lower market price. The next step
is to show that even if the market price increases following the merger,
there are conditions under which social welfare is increasing. When the
price increases, consumers are hurt by a takeover as total demand is
reduced (and price is above the marginal cost of production of the most
ecient rm). Rivals, however, can react to this merger. Since the new
merged rm becomes less aggressive than the sum of its parts, rivals
increase production, hence their market share and prots.
11
In some
cases, this increase in prots is sucient to outweigh the consumers'
losses. For example, if the elasticity of demand is constant and equal to
 in absolute value, and if all rms have constant marginal costs, then
a (small) merger between rms 1 and 2 that raises the market price is
socially desirable if and only if
2(s
1
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2
) < 1  (1 +
1

)
X
i2O
s
2
i
;
where s
i
is the pre-merger market share of rm i, and O is the set of
outsiders to the merger.
The only mergers that are likely to take place are those which gen-
erate positive prots for the merging rms. Merger participants do not
take into account the eect of the merger on consumer surpluses and
rivals' prots. There is thus an externality that is not taken into ac-
count in the decision. The sign of the externality depends on the case at
hand. Consider Figure 1. On the vertical axis is the change in prots of
the merging rms. On the horizontal axis is the size of the externality
on consumers and rivals. All mergers that give an outcome above the
negatively-sloped 45

line are socially desirable. Mergers in regions B,
C, and D are privately optimal. If antitrust authorities can evaluate
the social desirability of a merger, all mergers in region D should be
blocked by the Competition Bureau. Mergers in region A do not pri-
vately happen given that it is not in the interest of the merging parties
to pursue such venture. This implies that, if antitrust authorities can
screen for socially desirable mergers, there is an under supply of mergers
in a Cournot oligopoly.
The optimal policy for transferability of tax losses should therefore
be non-neutral. If tax losses are transferable only to similar lines of busi-
ness, mergers within the industry would be subsidized and social welfare
11
Note that this is not inconsistent with the two original rms wanting to merge,
since they gain from the price increase.
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would be increased when such mergers would take place. Transferability
without restrictions would not be an improvement since it would not
necessarily encourage mergers that rationalize production. In that case,
it would be preferable to restrict the use of tax losses to rms in the same
line of business. Relaxing restrictions on the speed of use of tax losses
following the merger would also serve to encourage mergers, especially
when mergers are costly.
Unfortunately, no welfare analysis seems to exist for rms competing
in prices. Such analysis would be complicated by the fact that goods
would not be homogeneous.
12
I now use that intuition to reassess mergers in a Cournot industry
when rms face tax asymmetries. As I established earlier, rms have
reduced incentives for merging when they want to arbitrage tax bills
because of the adverse strategic eect of reducing past prots. As just
discussed, without asymmetries, there are likely to be too few mergers
for production rationalization in Cournot industries. This only reinforces
the argument for a non-neutral policy that allows the transferability of
tax losses for mergers in the same line of business (possibly with few
restrictions on the speed of use of tax losses by the acquirer).
In Bertrand industries, no general analysis exists of the welfare eects
of mergers. Without taking into account the rationalization argument,
a (narrowly dened) neutral policy would not allow for the transferabil-
ity of tax losses as the only other source of ineciencies is due to the
asymmetric treatment of tax losses. Furthermore, mergers of tax losses
have anticompetitive eects.
3.4 Conclusion
What does the eciency of product market competition teaches us about
the optimal policy for the transferability of tax losses?
1. In competitive industries, a (narrowly dened) neutral policy is
desirable in which no tax losses can be transferred upon a merger.
2. In imperfectly competitive industries, results depend on industrial
structure. In Cournot industries, moving away from a neutral pol-
icy is desirable to increase the number of welfare-increasing merg-
ers. This can be achieved by allowing tax losses transferability
within the same line of business and possibly allow faster use of
tax losses by the acquirer.
12
If they were, the industry would be perfectly competitive.
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3. In Bertrand industries, a neutral policy is preferred to avoid anti-
competitive mergers (this abstracts from potential synergy gains).
As is often the case in industrial organization theory, conclusions are sen-
sitive to assumptions about industrial structure. It is therefore dicult
to assess dierent policies. Whether rms in a given industry compete
in prices or quantities becomes an empirical question, which is clearly
outside the scope of this paper.
4 Financial decisions
Tax asymmetries have implications for the optimal nancial structure of
a rm. Suppose that there are no tax asymmetries. The optimal debt{
equity ratio of a decent size rm trades o the corporate tax advantage
of debt and the expected bankruptcy costs in the event of default.
13
More debt yields tax savings through the interest rate deductions, while
it also increases the probability of bankruptcy. Since bankruptcy can be
quite costly in terms of legal fees, lost business, delayed or cancelled in-
vestments, rms typically limit the amount of debt they take on. Equity
usually provides the remaining necessary nancing.
14
Small and some medium-size rms do not have access to formal eq-
uity markets, either for informational reasons or because access to these
markets is quite costly. These rms are then nanced basically only
through debt and bank loans. Furthermore, these small rms often do
not generate large enough prots to benet fully from the interest rate
deductions.
4.1 Optimal nancial structure with tax asymme-
tries
With an asymmetric treatment of tax losses, rms with accumulated
past losses may face a dierent trade-o between debt and equity than
a rm with past prots. Past losses reduce signicantly the current
tax bill. Debt then loses its tax advantage. Firms having access to
the equity market may reduce their debt{equity ratio to reduce their
13
There have been numerous renements and extensions of this basic theory of
nancial structure. For example, many theories stress the informational role of nan-
cial structure and abstract from tax considerations. I do feel that these theories are
quite specialized and not necessarily relevant for this paper. Harris and Raviv (1991)
provide an excellent survey of recent theories of nancial structure.
14
I abstract here from the issues of personal taxation. In a more complete settings,
rms would choose nancial policy to minimize the total (corporate and personal)
tax bill.
19
expected bankruptcy costs. This is not a trivial operation, and past
losses must be signicant before a rm undertakes such venture. A rm
with past prots has the opposite incentive of raising its debt{equity
ratio since expected tax savings are greater the larger are accumulated
prots.
Takeovers are often seen as a means of restoring a rm's optimal
nancial structure. The wave of LBOs in the 1980s is believed to have
been motivated in part by the desire to increase the debt{equity ratio
of target rms. Patry and Poitevin (1991) documents a few Canadian
cases of hostile takeovers where tax considerations were an important
determinant of the takeover decision.
If the asymmetric treatment of tax losses creates distortions in the
rm's nancial structure, then allowing for the transferability of tax
losses is likely to help correct for this distortion. For example, a rm
with accumulated tax losses may have to reduce its debt beyond the op-
timal level. A takeover involving a protable rm would restore the op-
timal level as these past losses would be passed on to the raider, thereby
restoring the target's incentives to borrow to trade-o the tax savings of
debt and the expected bankruptcy costs. There is not a strong case here
to put restrictions on the transferability of losses. Optimality of nancial
structure would dictate allowing transferability without restrictions on
the line of business.
15
A similar logic would hold for a small rm that would have accu-
mulated losses. In that case, the distortions do not result in the wrong
debt{equity ratio, since the rm has diculty nancing through equity,
but in excessive risk borne by the rm. The transfer of its tax losses to a
protable rm would reduce that risk as it would share in the gains from
the tax savings. Again, transferability improves eciency, and there is
not a strong case for restrictions on transferability.
If, however, we stick to the narrow denition of neutrality, then trans-
ferability of tax losses cannot be invoked since the only distortions are
due to the asymmetric treatment of tax losses. A neutral policy without
transferability should therefore be preferred.
Finally, suppose that the preferred tax treatment given to debt -
nancing induces rms to take on too much debt, thereby exposing them-
selves to a socially inecient level of risk of bankruptcy (with its associ-
ated bankruptcy and agency costs). Then, a non-neutral policy may be
an optimal response. It is, however, dicult to assess what this policy
should be. On the one hand, not allowing transferability of tax losses
would induce a loss rm to take on less debt as it would lose its tax
15
Below, I consider the strategic aspect of debt which may alter this conclusion.
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advantage. On the other hand, allowing transferability may help con-
tribute to reduce the scal advantage of debt for rms that would acquire
these losses. The rst policy would create large asymmetries across rms
with respect to the incentives to use debt. The second policy would go
towards smoothing out these asymmetries across rms. It becomes an
empirical question as to which is socially better.
4.2 The dynamics of nancing
The above arguments rest on a static view of the world where default on
a loan leads to bankruptcy or at least to a costly reorganization phase.
There is a recent literature on dynamic nancing models that abstract
from these bankruptcy costs to focus on the dynamics of nancing, ex-
plicitly assuming that even if a rm defaults on its nancial obligations, it
is still renanced because, looking ahead, it still has positive net present
value. There are two classes of models that consider the problem of
nancing a risk-averse rm.
In the rst class, nancial structure matters because neither the rm
nor the nancier can commit to future transfers. The rm cannot com-
mit to reimburse if bankruptcy is a more protable course of action,
while the nancier cannot commit to renance if it does not expect a
high enough return from these new investments. The dynamics of the re-
lationship between the rm and the nancier without commitment have
been studied by Thomas and Worrall (1988), Gauthier, Poitevin, and
Gonzalez (1997) and Kocherlakota (1996a, 1996b). The basic intuition
is that the nancial contract must ensure that, at any point in the re-
lationship, both parties nd it in their own interest not to break the
relationship, meaning that the rm reimburses the bank when prots
are high, and the bank continues its nancing of the rm when prots
are low.
The distortions are created in these models by the lack of commit-
ment of the two agents. The nature of these distortions is that the rm
cannot insure completely against random shocks to its prots. It is easy
to show that the larger the collateral the rm can put up against its
loans, the smaller the distortions. As the rm's collateral increases, de-
faulting becomes less valuable for the rm. It then has more incentives
to maintain the relationship, thus improving risk sharing.
Allowing tax losses to be transferable is like increasing the rm's
collateral. If these tax losses are lost by the rm (but used by the
nancier) in the event of bankruptcy, they act as an eective collateral
to help the rm secure nancing more easily. It should then contribute
to reduce risk-sharing distortions created by non-commitment problems.
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Again, there is not an issue of whether tax losses are transferred in the
same line of business or not. Financing distortions can therefore be
alleviated with a non-neutral policy for the transferability of tax losses
which creates valuable collateral. Maximal collateral is created when
there are few restrictions on the line of business where tax losses can
be used and few restrictions on the speed of use of the transferred tax
losses.
In the second class of models, distortions in nancial structure come
from the fact that the nancier cannot observe whether the rm is prof-
itable or not. The rm may claim that its prots are low to avoid
repaying completely the nancier. Incentives to repay are restored by
increasing the rm's debt if it does not repay fully today. Green (1987)
and Thomas and Worrall (1990) have studied the specics of this model.
If tax losses are transferable in such environment, they become an
alternative source of risk-sharing for the rm. Transferable tax losses
are then like \renegotiation" in incentive problems. They would then
make truth-telling constraints more stringent, thus increasing the cost of
nancing of the rm. The same argument would hold in a static model
of costly state-verication a la Townsend (1979) or Gale and Hellwig
(1985). If you reduce the cost of defaulting by allowing the rm to sell its
tax losses, it becomes more dicult to convince the rm to reimburse its
debt. It would then be preferable not to allow tax losses transferability.
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4.3 Strategic aspects of nancial structure
As we saw in the last section, tax asymmetries can aect the nature
of competition in oligopolistic industries. It is interesting to combine
these results with the literature studying the strategic role of nancial
structure. Brander and Lewis (1986) have argued that debt could act
as a commitment device in a Cournot oligopoly and therefore aect the
extent of competition. A rm with a high leverage pursues an aggressive
strategy since it gures it has nothing to lose from doing so. Being con-
servative means almost certain default, while being aggressive is the only
chance the rm has of getting ahead. This strategy has been compared
to a hockey team trailing by a goal late in the game that decides to
pull out its goalie. A rm with high leverage thus behaves aggressively,
which, in a Cournot industry, forces its rivals to behave less aggressively.
The levered rm can then gain a competitive advantage over its rivals
by raising its debt{equity ratio. This is possible under the assumption
16
I implicitly assume here that only the rm could use these tax losses. If the
nancial contract forbids the rm from doing so, then transferability of losses becomes
a non-issue.
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that the rm is committed not to alter its debt-equity ratio ex post
once it has been set. This may be a reasonable assumption for rms
for which issuing equity is very costly due either to transaction costs or
informational asymmetries.
With tax asymmetries, it is not obvious that debt still has the same
strategic value. Increasing debt makes it more likely that the rm will
realize tax losses since it can deduct interest payments from its taxable
income. As we saw in the last section, these losses have a negative
strategic value in a Cournot industry. When choosing nancial structure,
rms therefore trade o the immediate strategic value of debt with the
possible future reduction in strategic advantage if the rm realizes losses
at the end of the period.
In such case, being able to transfer losses to a rm in a dierent
industry would mitigate that second eect and potentially restore the
strategic value of debt. This may be seen as welfare improving since it
results in a more competitive industry with a lower price. But since this
last eect is solely due to the asymmetric treatment of tax losses, this
would go against our denition of a narrow neutral policy which would
favor here not allowing transferability of tax losses.
4.4 Conclusion
A neutral policy for transferability of tax losses is socially optimal in
static theories of nancial structure and in dynamic theories of nancing
under asymmetric information. A non-neutral policy is optimal when
rms and nanciers face commitment problems. Transferable tax losses
can then act as a valuable collateral that reduces the commitment prob-
lem and improves risk sharing. In that case, transferability should not
be restricted to the same line of business, and the speed of use of losses
may be an instrument that increases the value of the collateral. It is
therefore not clear that the speed of use should be the same as before
the transfer. Finally, in a global context, it is important to remember
that the preferred treatment of debt may induce distortions of its own
that may be alleviated by an appropriate policy on transfers of losses,
as is discussed at the end of Section 4.1.
5 Investment and risk-taking
The impact of the asymmetric treatment of tax losses and prots on
investment decisions and risk-taking has not been studied extensively by
economists. Before explaining the results that appear in the literature, it
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is useful to explain why the scal asymmetry can aect behavior beyond
what has already been presented in earlier sections.
When prots and losses are treated asymmetrically, risk-neutral rms
have a non-linear after-tax prot function in terms of pre-tax prots. It
is composed of two linear segments: one for the taxable region, the other
for the non-taxable region. Since rms face dierent marginal tax rates
over these two regions, the function becomes non-linear. If, as is usually
the case, prots are taxed while losses are not tax-refunded, the after-
tax prot function is concave. The scal asymmetry makes a risk-neutral
rm risk-averse. Intuitively, a rm facing an asymmetric tax schedule
should behave similarly to a risk-averse rm. This is the essence of the
result that we nd in the literature.
Auerbach (1986) studies the dynamics of investment under an asym-
metric tax schedule. Losses are not tax-refunded but can be carried
forward. He rst studies an income tax where economic depreciation
of an investment is deducted against the income of that investment. He
shows that regardless of accumulated losses, investment is always smaller
than under a symmetric tax schedule. Furthermore, investment is sensi-
tive to the amount of tax losses that the rm has. The higher the losses
are, the larger is the investment. In the limit, as losses become innite,
investment is arbitrarily close to the investment under symmetric tax-
ation. There are two ways of explaining this result. First, since losses
are not tax-refunded, losses are more costly after tax than prots are
protable. The marginal benet of investment is then reduced, which
implies that the rm reduces its investment. Second, since the rm is ef-
fectively risk-averse, it wants to reduce the variance of rm value, which
is achieved through a reduction in its investment.
Under a cash-ow tax, investment is immediately expensed if current
prots are large enough. Results are then dierent. Firms choose their
investment trading o future after-tax returns with current tax savings.
If current prots are high, rms have a tendency to overinvest to get
an immediate tax deduction. Thus, when current prots are high, rms
invest more than under symmetric taxation. When, however, current
prots are relatively low, rms underinvest by the same logic as under
an income tax.
These results imply that the way rms deduct their investment ex-
penditures aects signicantly their investment policy. It is therefore im-
portant to assess taxation policy considering simultaneously the asym-
metric treatment of tax losses and investment tax credits (see Mintz,
1991, for arguments along these lines).
The above analysis does not take into account the fact that rms
can mitigate some of these eects through an osetting nancial policy.
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Basically, if, due to tax losses, a rm reduces its value by changing its
investment, it can use its nancial policy to oset these eects by eec-
tively endogenizing its tax losses through an appropriate combination
of debt and equity. Alternatively, because tax losses make rms risk
averse, the rms may seek nancing to diversify this risk. Mayer (1986)
has shown that a rm could eectively maintain an optimal investment
policy (i.e., the same as under symmetric taxation) by judicious adjust-
ment to its nancial structure. If one believes that asymmetric taxation
aects investment and risk taking, it remains to be explained why rms
do not use nancial policy to eliminate investment distortions.
Corporate nance theory can answer this question. Informational
asymmetries, agency costs, and incentives all have an impact on nan-
cial policy. It is therefore likely that rms cannot completely oset
investment distortions. Furthermore, empirically, debt{equity ratios are
far less volatile than tax losses. We can then conclude that asymmetric
taxation does inuence investment.
It is not obvious whether small rms are more aected than larger
rms or not. On the one hand, small rms do not have the nancial
exibility to oset investment distortions. On the other hand, however,
as Auerbach (1986) shows, investment is increasing in the amount of
tax losses. Since small rms are more likely to have larger losses, their
investment may be less distorted. Furthermore, small rms face a lower
nominal tax rate than do larger rms. It may well be the case that small
rms' investment policy is less distorted than larger rms'.
An important aspect of this literature that does not appear to have
been studied is the macroeconomic implications of tax asymmetries. As
shown by Auerbach (1986), investment is more variable under an asym-
metric tax regime than under a symmetric one. If losses are correlated
across rms and industries, it may be the case that tax asymmetries
have a countercyclical eect on the economy. In a downturn, many rms
would have experienced losses, which would then reduce their implicit
marginal tax rate, and therefore increase their investment. So rms
would tend to invest more in recessions. It would be interesting to study
the smoothing role of tax asymmetries in a real-business cycle model.
Is there a role for tax losses transferability? As in the previous sec-
tion, tax asymmetries create distortions which may be reduced when
rms pool prots. In the limit, when the aggregate risk is low, a coali-
tion of all rms would have positive prots with near certainty, and would
thus not be subject to the scal asymmetry. So, if losses are transferable
without restrictions, distortions can be eliminated with greater proba-
bility. It should be stressed, however, that the takeover mechanism is a
very imperfect mechanism to reduce these distortions, namely because
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it is subject to other imperfections that were discussed earlier. But
these considerations should not be taken into account if one adopts the
narrow denition of neutrality since the only distortions arise from the
asymmetric treatment of tax losses.
6 Conclusion
This paper has surveyed the current literature on tax asymmetries and
mergers to understand the eciency consequences of allowing or not
the transferability of tax losses upon a change of control. Economic
theory leads to mixed conclusions regarding the transferability of losses.
A non-neutral policy is generally optimal if there are too few or too
many takeovers. In these cases, policy with respect to transferability of
tax losses can be used to encourage or discourage takeovers and thus
improve economic eciency. I refer the reader to the end of each section
for more specic conclusions.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, I provide a short summary of the main aspects
of the scal treatment of tax losses for Canada and the United States.
For additional details, Couzin (1991) provides an excellent non-technical
presentation of the various features of the Canadian law.
A.1 Canada
The tax base for corporations in Canada is income (as opposed, for
example, to gross revenues). This implies that a negative tax base be-
comes a denite possibility. Various issues arise regarding the scal
treatment of income losses. First, when can losses be aggregated with
positive income from other sources to reduce taxable income. This issue
arises within the same accounting period across activities, and across
accounting periods. Finally, the issue of refundability of tax losses is a
major concern. If positive income is taxed, should negative income bear
a negative income tax? I now review some legal aspects relating to these
issues.
The rst step is to calculate business income. It is gross revenues from
which various deductions can be subtracted. There are some peculiarities
that should be mentioned here. For example, interest payments on debt
are deductible while dividend payments on equity are not tax deductible.
Also, some equipment may be subject to accelerated depreciation for tax
purposes. Firms are allowed generous write-os for R&D expenditures.
The resource sector also benets from preferential tax treatment, namely
for exploration expenses. These measures were introduced to stimulate
investment in certain sectors of activity, or focus investment in certain
areas (such as R&D). These deductions mean that negative business
income is more than a theoretical curiosity.
In general, aggregation of business incomes across activities within
the same rm is allowed subject to the provision that capital losses can
only be applied against capital gains. Aggregation through time is sub-
ject to the following limits. Business losses may be carried back three
years and forward seven years. Capital losses may be carried back three
years and forward indenitely. Such aggregation allows a kind of refund-
ability, although not at full value since carryforwards do not bear interest
and the probability of realizing on a carry forward is generally less than
one. It is important to point out that carryforwards can eectively be
more than seven years if businesses in a loss status delay some expenses
such as depreciation until they become taxable again.
Another way of getting a tax refund is to transfer tax losses from a
non-taxable rm to a taxable one. There are four ways of doing so. First,
agents can use statutory transfers. In the resource sector, rms can use
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ow-through shares to nance exploration expenditures. Such equity -
nancing allows the subscriber to deduct the share price from its taxable
income if the issuer has renounced to its deductions on exploration ex-
penses. A non-taxable issuer can therefore raise equity nancing at a
favorable after-tax price since subscribers get a generous tax deduction
by investing in these ow-through shares.
Second, agents can use non-statutory transfers. The general principle
is that a non-taxable rm raises capital at an advantageous after-tax
cost of funds by providing investors access to some of its deductions or
credits. For such a transaction to benet from this favorable tax status,
it has to be the case that it cannot be viewed as a disguised loan. A
simple example would be subscribers that borrow to invest in shares of a
project. They benet from the interest deduction while the non-taxable
rm would not be able to do so. Leasing of equipment is another mean
of transferring deductions. Leasing, however, is subject to the restriction
that capital cost allowances cannot create losses that would be applied
against positive income elsewhere in the corporation (unless leasing is
the main business activity).
Third, the sale of a corporation can allow the transfer of tax losses
subject to the restrictions that such losses can only be used in a similar
line of business and that the acquirer buy more than 50% of the voting
shares of the sold corporation. It should also be mentioned that capital
losses are not transferable to the acquiring party. Furthermore, the scal
year of the acquired company ends on the day of change of control such
that current losses are treated as the previous year's losses.
Finally, given the dierential scal treatment of interest payments
and dividends, rms may implicitly transfer tax losses by changing their
nancial structure and paying dividends instead of interest payments.
As stated above, this is a very succinct summary of some of the legal
aspects of the scal treatment of tax losses. More details are provided
in Couzin (1991).
A.2 United States
This summary is based on Joint Committee on Taxation (1987). The
basic principle guiding the American scal treatment of losses is that
the law should help preserve the needed averaging function over time
to reduce distortions caused by the annual accounting system. The law
would not then place at a disadvantage rms for which prots are highly
volatile. Upon change of control, this principle implies that the law
should put limitations on carryover against income earned in unrelated
lines of business since the contrary would not serve the averaging func-
tion. Upon change of control, the American legislator has therefore opted
for imposing limitations on the sources of income against which losses
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can be carried over rather than increasing time limitations for which
these losses could be used.
Any net operating loss can be carried back three years and forward,
fteen years. Upon change of control (see Joint Committee on Taxation,
1987, for a detailed description of what is eectively a change of control),
there is an annual limitation on the amount of losses that can be carried
forward to the protable rm (it could be the acquirer or the target).
The maximum allowed amount is equal to the pre-acquisition fair market
value of the loss corporation's equity times the long term return on
federal government bonds. The purpose of this limitation is to ensure
that, following a change of control, losses are used at the same speed as
they would have been without the change.
There is a limitation to the extent to which losses can be carried
forward. The new venture should pass the \continuity of business enter-
prise" test requiring that a signicant portion of the acquired assets be
used in a business activity at all times for a two-year period following
the ownership change. This implies that, either the loss corporation is
pursuing its historic business, or its assets are used in a business activity
following the ownership change.
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